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ABSTRACT  
 
Diamonds are one of the most valuable elements on earth, having the potential to contribute to 
economic development. However, in recent years, it has come to the world’s attention that the 
illicit trading in diamonds has financed gruesome wars and human rights abuse, and the 
problem has not gone away. These diamonds have come to be termed as conflict diamonds. In 
order to mitigate conflict diamonds altogether, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS) was established in 2003.  The KPCS has shown to have had mixed success since its 
implementation in the conflict diamond affected countries. Both Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe 
are members of the KPCS, but have had different outcomes since joining. The KPCS has in 
fact shown to be more successful in mitigating conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone than in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The aim of this paper is to determine why the KPCS has been more successful in mitigating 
conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe. This has been done by conducting a 
qualitative comparative case study of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe in order to establish under 
what circumstances the KPCS can be most effective and successful. Relevant political 
theories have been used for the sake of answering the aim. The findings of this paper show 
how diamond geographical characteristics, as well as whom the main beneficiaries of the 
conflict diamonds are, has a significant impact on the KPCS capacity to be effective in Sierra 
Leone and Zimbabwe. The paper concludes that the major problem of the KPCS effectiveness 
lies in the KPCS official definition of conflict diamonds.  
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1.1 Introduction 
This opening chapter introduces the topic and objective of the thesis; underlining the relevance of the 
study. Thereafter, a delimitation, motivation and thesis outline follows  
 
For centuries diamonds have been seen as a symbol of eternal love. It is also one of the most 
valuable elements on earth, having the potential to contribute to both economic growth and 
development. Despite that Africa currently accounts for approximately 65 percent of the 
world’s supply in rough diamonds, it has not had the same economic growth or stability as 
other diamond abundant regions (WDC, 2008).  
  
In the last decade, it has come to the world’s attention that Africa’s diamond production, and 
more precisely, the illegal trading of diamonds has been funding the majority of civil wars in 
Africa. Consequently, this has had detrimental effects on the affected countries growth and 
stability. The trade of these diamonds, financing civil wars have come to be termed as 
‘conflict diamonds’ (Lwanda G, 2003).  
  
As a result of the international communities raised awareness of conflict diamonds, the 
Kimberley Process (KP) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 
2000. The KP was a tripartite agreement between governments, industry and civil society 
(KP, 2015). As a result of the KP, an international certification scheme named the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) came into force in 2003. The KPCS set out 
requirements for regulating the rough diamond production and trade with the objective of 
eliminating the trade in conflict diamonds altogether, and ensuring that diamond buys are no 
longer funding violence in the form of war (KP, 2015).  
  
The KPCS has been essential for breaking the connection between diamonds and conflict 
(GW 2013). The KPCS has been on-stream for twelve years and since its implementation its 
effectiveness has been widely debated. Whilst many argue how effective the scheme has been 
in curbing the flow of conflict diamonds. Others argue, how the KPCS has fallen short in its 
duties, this is because, recent cases of conflict diamonds have shown how these diamonds do 
not only manifest in the form of conflict, it can take other forms such as government-
suppression, corruption and human rights abuse (Bieri, 2009).  
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1.2 Objectives and Research Question 
The objective of this thesis is to determine why the KPCS has had mixed success in 
mitigating conflict diamonds, this will be done by looking at the two countries different 
circumstances. By doing a comparative case study on Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, this has 
the aim of showing why the KPCS has been more successful in mitigating conflict diamonds 
in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe. There is a wealth of literature that explores the negative 
effects of conflict diamonds and the KPCS effectiveness. However, an in-depth comparison 
between Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe in regards to the KPCS effectiveness has not been 
encountered. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to political science literature by 
analysing why conflict diamonds have facilitated different outcomes in the two chosen 
countries, in order to explain why the KPCS success differs in Sierra Leone than in 
Zimbabwe. The following research question will guide the paper;  
 
• 	  ‘Why has the KPCS been more successful in mitigating conflict diamonds in Sierra 
Leone than in Zimbabwe, and under what circumstances is the KPCS most effective?’  	  
 
1.3 Delimitations and Motivations  
 
1.3.1 Delimitations  
There are various limitations to take into consideration in regards to this paper. First of all, the 
paper will merely focus on the KPCS effectiveness, in the sense that it examines why it has 
had more success in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe. Therefore, this paper will not include 
the process prior to the KPCS. This could have served as an interesting part of the analysis; 
however, this is beyond the scope of this paper, as it focuses on the effectiveness of the 
scheme. A second limitation to be aware of is that drawing conclusions from the analysis of 
two cases can potentially lead to problems with generalizability of the results (Bryman, 2008). 
However, I am aware of this and therefore understand that these two cases cannot explain the 
KPCS effectiveness as a whole.  
 
The third limitation that has been taken into consideration is in regards to my chosen research 
strategy. This thesis has found a qualitative research strategy as the most suitable one. 
However, due to this, I must be aware of my own built-in research bias (Bryman, 2008). In 
order to minimise this problem, my own opinions and biases have been confronted throughout 
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the process of data analysis. This has been done in order to make the thesis as trustworthy as 
possible. The fourth limitation that has been encountered is that the thesis could have 
benefited greatly from interviews with KP members, as well as Sierra Leonean and 
Zimbabwean officials, but due to lack of time and financial constraints this was not possible. 
The final limitation that has been taken into account is that the KP’s website has restrictions, 
and at some times, it was particularly hard to access information about the member countries. 
This could have strengthened the thesis even further.  
 
1.3.2 Motivation  
As previously mentioned, a comparative case study of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe will be 
used in the hopes of answering the stated research question. The reason for choosing these 
two countries is that they both are major suppliers of rough diamonds, and have consequently, 
become dependent on the revenues diamonds produce (Le Billion, 2001; Collier, 2008). The 
majority of the diamonds found in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe are, or have been, conflict 
diamonds. Subsequently, they are both members of the KPCS. The two chosen countries are 
also situated in one of the poorest parts in the world, namely Sub-Saharan Africa (Collier, 
2008). 
 
Even though, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share these similarities, they have had different 
outcomes since joining the KPCS. The KPCS has shown to be more successful in its 
implementation in Sierra Leone, this has been shown, as there has been an immense change in 
the countries trading of conflict diamonds (Maconachie, 2008). However, in Zimbabwe, the 
KPCS had not had the same success towards mitigating conflict diamonds (GW 2012). It is 
therefore of great relevance examining why the KPCS has been more successful in mitigating 
conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.4 Thesis Outline  
The thesis is presented as follows; Section 2 presents a short background of what the KPCS 
exactly is and some of the major issues surrounding the two chosen cases have and are faced 
with. The following section presents previous studies and relevant political theory. Section 4 
describes the methodology. Section 5 presents the analysis, which is the main part of the 
paper. A concluding section summarises my findings.  
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2 Background 
A brief background of the KPCS and the local situation in regards to the KPCS in Sierra 
Leone and Zimbabwe  
 
The KPCS was a result of the KP negotiations, and is currently the only global certification 
scheme for rough diamonds (Kantz, 2007). The KPCS has exposed wide-ranging 
requirements on its members in order for them ‘to certify shipment of rough diamonds as 
‘conflict free and stop conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade’ (KP, 2015). As of 
July 2013, there were 54 members in the KPCS representing in total 81 countries (KP, 2015). 
Under the terms of the KPCS, participant countries must:  
- ‘Meet the ‘minimum requirements’ and put in place national legislation and 
institutions; export, import and internal controls 
- Commit to transparency and the exchange of statistical data 	  
- Participant can only legally trade with other participants who have also met the 
minimum requirements of the scheme 	  
- International shipment of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a KP certificate 
guaranteeing that they are conflict free’ 	  
                                                                                          -The Kimberley Process, 2015 
 
The KPCS has been on-stream for 12 years, and it has been argued how it has evolved into a 
semi-effective scheme for stopping the trade in conflict diamonds. On the one hand, statistics 
by the KP indicate how conflict diamonds merely represent one percent of the international 
trade in diamonds compared to approximately 15 percent in the late 1990s (PAC, 2015). 
According to these statistics the KP has been able to support development in unstable and 
poor countries by bringing a vast amount of diamonds onto the legal market that would 
otherwise not have been possible. 
 
The case of Sierra Leone shows how there has been an immense change in the trade of 
conflict diamonds in the country since becoming members of the KP. Throughout the 1990s, 
Sierra Leone’s diamonds were able to finance rebel groups activities, which consequently led 
to the onset of war, this “became a tragedy for humanitarian, political and historic 
proportions” (PAC 2000; 3). In 2013, nine years after joining the KPCS, Sierra Leone legally 
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exported approximately $184 million worth of diamonds, compared to only 1.3 million in 
1999 (KP, 2013; Ellis & van Kessel, 2009). According to these statistics, it can be argued 
how, the KPCS has been very useful in its application, due to it success in forcing a large 
volume of illicit diamonds into official channels. It has been exceptionally acclaimed for its 
success in stopping the rebel groups who before were able to illegally capture diamond 
revenues (Maconachie, 2008).  
 
In contrast to this, the KPCS has not hade the same success in halting the flow of conflict 
diamonds in other countries. Countries such as the Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic 
and Zimbabwe are examples of the KPCS failure. Most recently, Zimbabwe, and the Marange 
diamond mines have gained increased attention. This is because the Zimbabwean government 
has been able to control these diamonds in order to facilitate violence of their own sort and 
lawless competition (PAC, 2009). Consequently, the KP has been criticised for reacting with 
limited action towards the Marange diamonds (GW, 2013).     
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3 Literature Review 
The following chapter presents the theoretical framework used in the thesis. Firstly, previous 
academic studies that have contributed to the paper are discusses; thereafter-relevant 
political theory on the subject is presented  
 
3.1 Previous Studies  
 
3.1.1 Conflict Diamonds  
 
Commonly, natural resources like gold, diamonds and oil can be considered as major assets 
for economic growth and development, while a lack of resources is can be seen as a limit to 
economic and development possibilities (Reddy et al, 2005). Diamonds are one of the most 
valuable elements on earth, consequently, it could be anticipated that they would provide 
major assets for economic growth and development. However, in countries like Sierra Leone, 
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) diamonds have not facilitated this. 
Instead, diamonds have contributed to poverty, war and political uncertainty (Reddy et al, 
2005). Silverstein (2003) argues how diamonds are the easiest targets for rebels and 
government officials; because they are easily smuggled, extremely profitable and small in 
size. Conflict diamonds are the ones that are mined or sold in order to provide resources for 
weapons, and facilitate civil wars.  In the last two decades, conflict diamonds, have been 
major sources of civil wars within Africa. Consequently, these diamonds have resulted in the 
deaths of numerous people (Reno, 2000).  
 
3.1.2 Lootable and Non-Lootable Resources  
Natural resources are categorized into two groups; lootable and non-lootable resources 
(Snyder & Bhavni, 2005). They are categorised in this way in order to distinguish between 
natural resources that produce rents and does that do not (Le Billion, 2001). Lootable 
resources are the ones that are geographically disperse and have low economic barriers; due to 
their geological characteristics various actors can easily and effortlessly capture them in order 
to acquire profits. Non-lootable on the other hand, are geographically concentrated and 
require a considerable amount of capital and technology in order to attain profit (Snyder & 
Bhavni, 2005). In regards to diamonds, Passas and Jonas (2006) state how diamonds are also 
divided into two major groups of deposits, these being either kimberlite or alluvial diamonds. 
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Taken these distinctions, it has been argued how, kimberlite diamonds are lootable resources, 
as they require an ample amount of capital and advanced technology for extraction. Alluvial 
diamonds, on the other hand, can be regarded as lootable resources, as they are found near the 
earth’s surface, and require only a small amount of capital and manual labour in order to be 
mined (Snyder & Bhavani, 2005).  
 
In order to have control of lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, the government must 
invest a significant amount in its security sector; this is because artisanal miners usually 
violate and access lootable resources and their mines. Therefore, it becomes challenging for 
governments to maintain control where lootable resources exist. This is especially the case, 
when countries have weak institutions or poor systems of governance. As well as this, Snyder 
& Bhavni (2005) argue that countries with; weak institutions, are politically instable and have 
a vast supply of lootable resource has a bigger tendency to experience civil war than countries 
that have strong institutions and are instead endowed with non-lootable resources such as 
kimberlite diamonds. However, they argue how there is no guarantee that a country with a 
vast supply of non-lootable resources will achieve stability, as corruption can occur by 
political leaders and elites (Snyder & Bhavni, 2005). Smilie (2005) states how alluvial 
diamonds that are lootable in their characteristics, are also those diamonds that have been 
referred to as conflict diamonds.  
 
3.2.2 The KPCS  
Several authors have examined the link between natural resources and civil war. Collier & 
Bannon (2003) state how many developing countries rely on their primary commodities 
because of the revenues they produce. Consequently, the majority of resources that fuel civil 
war, and in regards to this paper, the diamonds that fuel war are dependent on the access to 
the global economy. For this reason, numerous strategies have been suggested in order to 
improve natural resource governance. Collier & Bannon (2003) continues to argue how an 
increasing transparency of natural resource revenues, shutting out rebel groups from the 
market and criminalising the finance of illicit commodities would help to manage natural 
resources in the best way.  
 
In a similar manner, Le Billion (2003) argues the importance of ensuring that the financial 
wealth this is produced by resource exploitation needs to be detained and diffused by the 
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society. Using strategies such as targeted sanctions, market regulations and commodity 
certification schemes can easily help to end resource-fuelled conflicts. Ross (2003) also 
indicate how better policies can decrease the likelihood that resources can create conflict. The 
above stated authors, all believe that by shutting out of rebel groups through better market 
regulations, resource wars could come to an end (Collier & Bannon, 2003; Le Billion, 2003; 
Ross, 2003).  
 
It can be argued how the KPCS can be seen as an example of this type of market regulation. 
This is because the KPCS is an international certification scheme that regulates the rough 
diamonds trade by deciding the rules that all involved actors must follow. The KPCS has the 
aim of protecting the legitimate diamond trade while stopping the circulation of illicit 
diamonds.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
3.2.1 Lootable and Non-lootable Resources  
Snyder & Bhavni (2005) has put forth a distinction between natural resources that produce 
rents and those that do not. Namely, lootable and non-lootable resources. Lootable resources 
are geographically disperse and have low economic barriers. Consequently, these resources 
become easily subject to predation by various actors, most often non-state actors. In 
comparison, a non-lootable resource is geographically concentrated and acquires extensive 
capital and hi-tech technology in order to be extracted. Therefore, it is usually the state that 
controls non-lootable resources. Hence, lootable resources provide rents to non-state actors, 
whilst non-lootable provide rents to state actors.  
 
3.2.2 Diamonds and Civil War  
According to previous research, there is a connection between natural resources and civil war. 
Several authors have specifically focused on the link between diamonds and conflict. Lulaja 
(2010) states how natural resources play a fundamental part in violent conflict, especially in 
regards to those resources that are easily extractable, such as gemstones. In a similar manner, 
it has been argued how the availability of moveable, high-value resources, such as diamonds 
is an important reason for rebel groups formation, and commencement of civil wars (HRW, 
2004).  
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Collier & Hoeffler (2002) argues how conflict has for a long time been facilitated by natural 
resource exploitation. They state how a country with a large amount of natural resources has a 
higher tendency for violent conflict than those without. More specifically, that rebel groups 
are more motivated by the control over resources than by actual political differences. This 
argument has been referred to as the ‘greed or grievance’ argument. The greed being the 
desire to acquire more wealth, and grievance being related to inequalities, lack of political 
rights and ethnic or religious division in society. Lootable natural resources such as diamonds 
are specifically used to describe natural resources that cause conflict.  
 
3.2.3 Diamonds and Authoritarianism  
Ross (2003) argues how resource rents have a tendency to promote authoritarianism. More 
specifically, he puts emphasis on the fact that political leaders have for a long time used 
resource rents to stop democratic development. He states that because of this, political leaders 
have been able to embed themselves in power. Le Billion (2001) argues along the same lines; 
how resource rents created by natural resources can lead to the creation of clientelistic 
regimes. These clientelistic regimes, are established on a system of patronage where the 
followers of the regime are rewarded and the opponents are instead punished; because 
developing countries often have weak institutions and poor governance systems, it makes it 
possible for politicians to use the resource rents for politician profits, and support their 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
Reno (2000) states in a similar manner how the availability of resources can create 
authoritarianism by allowing leaders and elites in resource abundant countries to construct 
shadow states. The leaders and elites within the shadow state, develop patronage networks, 
which allows them to interfere in private markets in order to gather revenues. Consequently, 
the gathered revenues are used through illicit networks to maintain their unlawful power, and 
for personal gain.  
 
3.2.4 Conflict Diamond Definition  
The KP (2015) has put forth the official definition for conflict diamonds. They define it as 
‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments’. 
Reddy et al (2005) argue how the KP’s definition of conflict diamonds is heavily influenced 
by the gruesome diamond fuelled civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 
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1990s and 2000s. It was during these civil wars, rebel leaders used diamonds to buy arms in 
order to fuel the wars.  
 
It has been argued how the contemporary issues facing the diamond industry today is not only 
restricted to rebel movements and their use of diamonds in order to fund wars and overthrow 
governments. New cases actually show how legitimate governments are using diamonds to 
finance weapons, launder money as well as violate human rights (Smilie, 2005; HRW, 2004). 
It can be argued how the current conflict diamond case of Zimbabwe reveals the shortcomings 
of this definition. The definition should include all possible scenarios associated with conflict 
diamonds.  
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4 Methodology 
This chapter presents a detailed description of why certain research methods were selected over 
others in the paper. 
 
4.1 Research Strategy 
Bryman (2008) explains that a qualitative or quantitative research strategy can be used when 
conducting a research strategy. This study has used a qualitative strategy, as it has aimed at 
providing a detailed research of why the KPCS has been more successful in mitigating 
conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe. The chosen strategy has helped in 
answering the research question. Bryman (2008) states how qualitative research is used when 
the researcher is interested in how the world is observed. It was therefore obvious to choose a 
qualitative research strategy for this paper as it focuses on the analysis, hence, leaving room 
for interpretation.  
 
4.2 Epistemological Consideration 
According to Bryman (2008) there is usually a philosophical divide in regards to 
epistemology. A qualitative research strategy most often uses an interpretivist epistemology, 
whilst quantitative research uses a positivist (Bryman, 2008). Bryman (2008) explains how an 
interpretivisim epistemology is a theory of knowledge where the researcher grasps the 
subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2008). Due to the chosen topic of conflict 
diamonds, and the stated research question of ‘why the KPCS has been more successful in 
mitigating conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe, and under what 
circumstances is the KPCS most efficient?’ an interpretivist view has been the most suitable 
epistemology to take when conducting this research. 
 
4.3 Research Method Approach  
When conducting a study, the researcher can either take a deductive or inductive approach 
when exploring the relationship between theory and research (Bryman, 2008). This paper has 
used a deductive approach. This was the most suitable approach as the theory guides the 
research and it has the aim of reaching a result based on theory. Therefore, this research has 
been guided by prevailing theories. Previous studies made it easy to choose a deductive 
approach; as there is an abundant amount of scholarly articles as well as established theories 
  16 
in regards to my chosen research topic (Bryman, 2008). However, even though this research 
has used a deductive approach, an inductive conclusion might arise as both my results and 
analysis could provide new theoretical features within my chosen research topic. 
 
4.4 Research Design  
Bryman (2008) describes how there are five different types of research designs when 
conducting a research. These are experimental design, cross-sectional design, longitudinal 
design, case studies and comparative studies. For this research, a comparative design has been 
applied in relation to the chosen qualitative research strategy. Bryman (2008) states that when 
this occurs, it takes the form of a multiple case study. Multiple-case studies occur when the 
number of cases is more than one. One major benefit of using a multiple-case study is that it 
can improve theory building. For this reason, a multiple-case study design was the most 
suitable. By comparing Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe to each other, it has made it easier to see 
if the chosen theories will hold or not (Yin, 2003). Consequently, the comparison of the two 
chosen cases, might suggest concepts that are relevant to emerging theory, this goes hand in 
hand, with the above stated of how the conclusion might take a inductive approach as new 
theoretical elements might arise.  
 
Yin (2003) states that multiple-case studies are used when the researcher aims at examining 
several cases in order to recognise the similarities as well as differences between cases. By 
comparing Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, the analysis will provide this. By having a 
comparative design in the form of a multiple case study, this paper can most likely be 
considered as robust and reliable (Baxter & Jack, 2008). However, it is important to bare in 
mind in regards to this research design that, even though the focus will be on two countries, 
the results will be loosely used to demonstrate and reveal the broader understanding of the 
KPCS and why it has worked better in one of the cases than the other.  
 
4.5 Collection of Data  
For this study, secondary data has been used in the form of scholarly articles and textbooks as 
well as Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reports and official publications. The reports 
that have been used have been published by; Human Rights Watch, Global Witness and 
Partnership Africa Canada. These have been used in order to assess the situation in the two 
countries. The paper has also been based on the KP’s publications. All these sources have 
been vital for the paper, as they have assessed the work done by the KP since its 
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establishment in 2003. This has given a historically informed view, which has made it easier 
to examine and understand the debates that have surrounded the KPCS effectiveness in Sierra 
Leone and Zimbabwe.  
 
4.6 Trustworthiness and Authencity  
Bryman (2008) states how qualitative and quantitative research should be evaluated and 
looked at differently to one another. In regards to quantitative, the research should be assessed 
through its reliability and validity. However, these concepts can be difficult to use when 
evaluating qualitative research. Instead, the terms trustworthiness and authencity can be used. 
During this research, four criterions of trustworthiness have been taken into consideration, 
these are; credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability (Bryman, 2008). As 
well as this, the authencity of the research has been taken into consideration. Being aware of 
these four criterions has helped to make the thesis trustworthy.  
 
4.7 Source Criticism  
The thesis is founded upon a vast amount of secondary sources. It is beneficial to use an 
abundant amount of different sources, instead of just a few as this could possibly lead to a 
biased view of the topic at hand (Esaisson et al, 2012). As the study is primarily based on 
secondary data, it is dependent on other people’s interpretation. To make sure that the articles 
are not biased or angled, the sources have been checked thoroughly. Especially in regards to 
Internet sources, as they can sometimes be seen as no trustworthy. However, as this thesis 
mainly consists of scholarly reports as well as articles and books this has not been seen as a 
major problem (Höglund & Öberg, 2011).  The reports and publications that have been 
published by various NGOs as well as the KP have also been looked at critically, as they 
could be biased to an extent.   
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5 Analysis 
The analysis is the main product of the paper. It is divided into three parts; firstly, Sierra Leone is 
analysed, followed by Zimbabwe, the KPCS and lastly a discussion that compares the two cases to 
each other. Previous studies and the theoretical framework will be used to guide the analysis.  
  
5.1 Introduction  
Diamonds have the potential to increase economic prosperity within a country. However, the 
majority of countries that have a vast supply of diamonds have not had this outcome. Instead, 
these countries have been faced with the issue of conflict diamonds (WDC, 2008). The 
conflict diamonds, have led to poverty, conflicts as well as authoritarianism (PAC, 2009). In 
order to mitigate the negative issues surrounding conflict diamonds the KPCS was 
established. However, the KPCS effectiveness and its capacity to mitigate conflict diamonds 
can be discussed. This is because the scheme has shown to be ineffective in several cases 
(Bieri, 2009). Consequently, it makes one wonder what the underlying causes are to why the 
KPCS has had different outcomes in different countries. This analysis intends to examine the 
different circumstances, and pre-conditions of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, in order to 
understand why the KPCS has had mixed success.  
 
5.2 Sierra Leone  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
This picture shows the location of the main diamond producing sites in Sierra Leone. They are shown in white.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 Picture extracted from the 2000 PAC Report  
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5.2.1 The Diamonds Geological Characteristics  
Sierra Leone is one of the smallest countries in West Africa, with an area of 72,000 square 
meters. Despite its small area, it is endowed with a vast amount of natural resources. Even 
though Sierra Leone has been blessed with an abundance of natural resources, such as, gold 
and diamonds, it remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with a ranking of 203 out of 
206 countries by World Development Report (Machonachie, 2008). Diamonds in Sierra 
Leone were discovered in 1932. Since, their discovery, Sierra Leone has been faced with 
serious social and political issues related to diamonds. This is mainly because of the diamonds 
geological characteristics, which makes them extremely hard to govern and trade (PAC, 
2000).  
 
While, Sierra Leone’s diamonds can be found in kimberlite pipes, the majority of them “are 
dispersed in the gravels of riverbeds and terraces as alluvial deposits” (Maconachie, 2008; 8). 
Consequently, Sierra Leone has an abundance of alluvial diamond mining fields, which cover 
approximately 20,000 square meters of the countries total area. These diamonds are of top-
quality and can easily be found on the earth’s surface (PAC, 2000). Due to this, they are 
mostly mined through artisanal mining. Artisanal mining is extremely difficult to control and 
regulate as the diamonds are spread over a big area. However, what makes this mining 
method unique, is that is requires only a small amount of capital and manual labour in order to 
mine the diamonds (Maconachie, 2008).  
 
5.2.2 Historical Overview- Prior to and the Onset of the Civil War  
Sierra Leone gained independence from the British in 1961. Shortly thereafter, diamond 
smuggling started to not only become a political issues but also an economical issue. In 1968, 
under Siaka Stevens All People’s Congress (APC) government, Sierra Leone was faced with a 
poor system of governance as well as economic mismanagement. Stevens, was the first leader 
that officially promoted illegal mining in order to acquire political power, and personal profit. 
Steven’s made Sierra Leone’s diamond mines public, which consequently, let to Steven’s 
having sole control of the mines.  Under Steven’s rule, the legitimate diamond trade dropped 
from approximately two million carats in 1970 to 48,000 carats in 1988 (Hirsch, 2001).  
Shortly after Steven’s retirement, Joseph Momah became Sierra Leone’s next leader, under 
Momah’s regime, illegal diamond mining drastically increased. By the end of the 1980s, 
Sierra Leone was near a state of collapse (Richards, 2003).  
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In 1991, Sierra Leone’s civil war commenced when Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a 
rebel group with members from both Sierra Leone and Liberia attacked east Sierra Leone. The 
leader, Foday Sankoh founded RUF because he wanted to represent all Sierra Leone’s 
deprived citizens. Sankoh argued how every single Sierra Leonean citizen should acquire an 
equal share of diamonds, not only the state. RUF used vicious strategies such as; mutilation, 
amputation and mass rape in order to get their voices heard. This was financed, through the 
trade in diamonds. During the nine years of civil war, fighting was focused in and around 
Sierra Leone’s diamond districts. This was because RUF was aware that whoever controlled 
the diamond mines controlled Sierra Leone (Hirsch, 2001). 
 
In 1999, Sankoh and Sierra Leone’s president Ahamad Tejan Kabbah signed the Lome peace 
Accord, which was a peace agreement, under harsh pressure from the UN. This peace 
agreement, granted Sankoh a position in the transnational government, as well as exoneration 
for him and his combatants. However, only months later, RUF forced an attack against the 
government, in Sierra Leone’s capital Freetown. Subsequently, the UNSC adopted an 
embargo of the trade in diamonds, which later on led to the creation of the KPCS  (Hirsch, 
2001).  
 
5.2.3 Beneficiaries of the Conflict Diamonds  
The 20th-21st century has seen a significant rise in armed conflict. These conflicts have mostly 
occurred in countries that are poor and have weak states. Additionally, these conflicts have 
been prevailed by the rise of new non-state actors (Richards, 2003). The civil war in Sierra 
Leone exemplifies this, as it commenced during a period of political and economical 
instability. Consequently, the non-state actor group, RUF, was able to take advantage of this 
situation.  
  
It has been widely debated, why armed conflicts occur, and especially why they happen in 
countries with an abundance of natural resources, are poor and have weak institutions (HRW, 
2004). Collier & Hoeffler (2002) explores this, by giving two contrasting arguments on the 
causes of civil war. These two arguments, explain how non-state actor groups, such as rebels, 
need a reason to start armed conflict. This is either, due to greed or grievance.  
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The greed argument, argues how armed conflict is cause by a rebels desire for self-
enrichment. These reasons are manifested in numerous ways, including economic gain 
through control and regulation of resources, or by increased power within a state. Conflicts 
motivated by greed are often shown in countries that have poor economic growth and poverty. 
The grievance argument on the other hand, argues how citizens rebel over issues of identity 
rather than issues concerning economics (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).  Nonetheless, the case of 
Sierra Leone shows how the RUF was motivated by greed; due to the fact that the RUF, was 
driven by the issue of economics, as they wanted gain control over the lootable alluvial 
diamonds in order to finance their illegal activities. Consequently this was an important 
motive in the commencement of Sierra Leone’s civil war.   
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5.3 Zimbabwe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 This paper shows a map of the location of the main production sites in Zimbabwe. 
 
5.3.1 The Diamonds Geological Characteristics  
Zimbabwe has an abundance of natural resources such as; gold, platinum coal and diamonds. 
Similarly to Sierra Leone, these natural resources have not been seen as a blessing, this is 
because the country has failed to benefit from them economically. The case of diamonds and 
how they have facilitated instability within the country has been particularly contested (PAC, 
2009).  
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Zimbabwe began to extract diamonds through artisanal mining. 
It was not until 2004, industrial mining operations began to take place in River Ranch and 
Murowa Mines (UNODC 2011). Theoretically, diamonds can basically be found anywhere in 
Zimbabwe. This is because of the countries geographical location; it lies on the ‘Zimbabwean 
Archaeon Craton’, which is known for its wealth in kimberlite diamonds (PAC, 2009). 
Zimbabwe consists of three diamond mining sites; River Ranch, Murowa and Marange. The 
River Ranch and Murowa mines are privately owned, and are kimberlite diamond mines. 
 
The Marange, on the other hand, consist of alluvial diamonds, such as the ones found in 
Sierra Leone. The initial discovery of these diamonds was made in 2005 (Mirell, 2012). The 
Marange diamond fields consist of over 66,000 hectares and are one the largest diamond 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 Picture extracted from; Létourneau, J., Smilie, I,.2009 
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discoveries ever made (Boell, 2010).  It was valued up to US $800 billion and could allegedly 
be used as a source of capital for the next 80 years in Zimbabwe (Nicholas, 2012). 
 
5.3.2 Historical Overview-Discovery of the Marange Diamonds and the Authoritarian 
Regime  
The general elections in Zimbabwe between Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was 
held in March 2008. The results showed how the MDC had won the majority of seats in 
parliament, but did not have majority in the presidential vote. Subsequently, a rerun of the 
presidential elections was initiated (Katsaura, 2010).  
 
In June 2008, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round of elections, as his supporters were 
being threatened by the ZANU-PF. Consequently, Mugabe became the only candidate for the 
general elections. During a period of one year, more specifically, between March 2008-2009, 
Zimbabwe had no official government. Finally in February 2009, the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) was formed between ZANU-PF and the MDC. However, as stated in PACs 
(2009) report, GNU was heavily undermined with political coercion by the ZANU-PF. During 
the 2013 general elections, Mugabe won 61 percent of the votes, whilst the MDC merely had 
34 percent (News24, 2013). 
 
Since the Marange diamond discovery, the Marange diamond fields have been frenzied by 
illegality and lawlessness, and very much because of the ZANU-PFs involvement. In the 
beginning, the Zimbabwean government failed to buy up the Marange diamonds because of 
cash restrictions. Nor did they give any exclusive right to one company. Consequently, the 
diamond mines were left opened and as they contained alluvial diamonds, they became 
extremely lucrative for smuggler, illegal miners and international buyers (PAC, 2009). This 
created a booming illegal market; Africa Confidential (2010; 5) reported that approximately 
“30,000 artisanal miners, as well as illicit buyers from neighbouring countries came to the 
Marange during this time”. 
 
5.3.3 Main Beneficiaries of the Conflict Diamonds  
The year of 2008-2009 did not only experience an absence of a government, but it also 
experienced hyperinflation. The hyperinflation reached its top at 79.6 billion in mid-
November 2008 (Hanke, 2009). During this year, Mugabe’s regime could easily capture the 
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alluvial diamonds in the Marange mines. As previously mentioned, the Marange diamonds 
were producing resource rents to the government. In accordance with this, Le Billion (2001) 
states how resource rents can provide political elites with traditional means for staying in 
power by establishing a regime which is set up upon a system of patronage; meaning that, the 
followers are rewarded and the opponents punished. This is exactly what was happening in 
the case of Zimbabwe and its government. In 2008, Mugabe forced the military to the 
Marange diamond mines in order to capture the area (Alex, 2010). It was during this military 
seizing; Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime could start financing activities against the opponent, 
MDC. 
 
During the turbulent year of 2008-2009, it can be argued how a state of anarchy was 
developed in Zimbabwe. This provided a chance for the establishment of a shadow economy 
(Nichols, 2012). Reno (2000) believes that the accessibility of resources, and in Zimbabwe’s 
case, the accessibility of diamonds, can facilitate authoritarianism by letting political rulers 
and elites, use the revenues that are collected through illegal channels to uphold their political 
power, and acquire personal gain. This illustrates how the political turmoil of 2008-2009 
created a chance for Mugabe to use the alluvial diamonds found in the Marange for personal 
gain.  The use of military in order to take hold of the Marange diamonds by the ZANU-PF, 
reveals how the creation of a shadow state, was a way to securitise hence protect Mugabe and 
the ZANU-PFs interests (Nichols, 2012).  
 
5.4 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme  
It can been argued how better market regulations are required when managing natural 
resources (Le Billion, 2003; Ross, 2003; Collier & Bannon, 2003). The KPCS can be seen as 
such an example. Up until this day, it is the most internationally acclaimed governance 
initiative in managing natural resources. Developing countries rely on their primary 
commodities due to the revenues they produce (Collier & Bannon, 2003). Diamonds are no 
exception. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, diamond abundance is not 
always positive. There are many negative effects related to diamonds, and therefore, it can be 
argued how the KPCS has been an essential market regulator for managing diamonds. It can 
be argued how the scheme has taken a specific focus on promoting good governance, resource 
management and positive development outcomes (Maconachie, 2008).  
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The KPCS became legally binding in 2003, since then, the scheme has according to statistics 
been successful in reducing the flow of conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds are now said to 
merely represent one percent of the international trade in diamonds, compared to 
approximately 15 percent in the 1990s (PAC, 2015). This shows, how the KPCS has been 
able to limited one source of war, diamonds. Consequently, the scheme has also been praised 
for limiting humanitarian catastrophes and institutional deteriorations that are connected to 
diamonds (Maconachie, 2008) However, this has on the other hand been debated, as some 
cases have shown the opposite.   
 
Nonetheless, the KPCS has shown to successful in bringing a large volume of diamonds that 
would otherwise not have been possible. This has increased the revenues of deprived 
governments, and helped them to address their countries development challenges (KP, 2015). 
Even though, the KPCS has found the connection between diamonds and conflict, it has failed 
to take into account other issues relating to diamonds.  
 
5.4.1 The KPCS in Sierra Leone  
The KPCS has been seen as an extremely important governance initiative for Sierra Leone’s 
diamond economy. Sierra Leone has for a long time, tried to arise and rebuild from the 
diamond fuelled civil war that occurred between 1991-2002. Since the KPCS implementation 
in 2003, it has allowed war-torn Sierra Leone to experience greater economic growth with a 
sharp rise in export earnings. Official exports in 2008 were valued to $140 million compared 
to $25 million in 2001 (Maconachie, 2008).  
 
Sierra Leone can be seen as one of the most crucial diamond producers in coastal West 
Africa, exporting around 600,000 carats, whereby 80 percent of these are produced in alluvial 
mines. However, what is perhaps more important than the rise in export earnings, is the fact 
that the KP has achieved to halt rebel groups and their ability to finance their activities by 
selling diamonds (Maconachie, 2008). 
 
The case of Sierra Leone, showed how diamonds were a major asset in the gruesome civil 
war, this was because diamonds provoked greed in the rebel group RUF. Sierra Leone’s 
Mineral Minister Mohamed Swarray- Deen stated how the KPCS “has returned the diamond 
industry back to the community which is rightly the main beneficiary. It was originally 
hijacked by a few greedy and corrupt people” (MG, 2003). 
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5.4.2 The KPCS in Zimbabwe’s Marange Diamond Fields  
The KPCS has showed to have different outcomes in Zimbabwe than in Sierra Leone. The 
Marange diamonds have been said to fuel government-sponsored suppression, human rights 
abuse and a total lack of respect for the rule of law and democratic values (PAC, 2010).  As 
early as 2006, human rights groups associated with the KP, such as Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and Global Witness (GW) reported misconduct in the Marange diamond mines, as 
they saw human rights abuse occurring. However, the Zimbabwean government, ignored this, 
and argued how this was not the case (PAC, 2010). As well as this, the KP reacted with little 
attention, and instead reported that the Zimbabwean government had followed the KPCS 
requirements (Smilie 2013).  
 
The KP conducted a review mission in 2009, it was not until then, the KP understood how 
deep the smuggling and government corruption was (Bieri, 2009). KP’s 2009 report stated 
how they recommended suspension of Zimbabwe, unless the illegal trading of diamonds did 
not stop, they would be banned altogether from selling and trading their diamonds in the 
global economy  (Farineau, 2013). However, Zimbabwe was not suspended and as a 
consequence of this, they scheme has been questioned in regards to its credibility, as well as 
its actual objectives (Barron, 2013).  
 
5.5 A Comparison Between Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe  
Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe do share some similarities. They are not only situated in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which is one of the poorest parts in the world, but they are also major 
suppliers of rough diamonds (Collier, 2008). One would think that a vast amount of diamonds 
would be beneficial due to the revenues the diamonds can produce. However, it can be argued 
that diamonds have instead facilitated economical, social and political instability (Lwanda, 
2003). The majority of these diamonds have been regarded as conflict diamonds. For this 
reason, both Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe are members of the KPCS.  
 
Even though, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share these similarities, and are both members of 
the KPCS, they have had different outcomes since joining the scheme. The previous sections 
have shown how the KPCS has been more successful in mitigating conflict diamonds in 
Sierra Leone than in Zimbabwe. The next section, will compare Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe 
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in order to clarify, what factors have differentiated in the two cases, and how this 
consequently, has had an effect on the KPCS effectiveness.  
 
5.5.1 The Characteristics of Diamonds 
Both Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe have an abundance of diamonds and they mostly consist of 
the alluvial sort. In accordance to Snyder & Bhavni’s (2005) argument, these sorts of 
diamonds tend to be lootable in their geographical characteristics since they are 
geographically dispersed and have low economic barriers. Consequently, due to these 
characteristics they tend to be easily subjected to predation by non-state actors. This has been 
illustrated in the case of Sierra Leone. Zimbabwe’s alluvial diamonds on the other hand, have 
been acting like non-lootable resources; because they have been stipulating rents to the 
government, and consequently, it is the legitimate government that have captured and taken 
control of these diamonds (PAC, 2009). It can be argued how these alluvial diamonds have 
had different effects on the two cases.  
 
In the case of Sierra Leone, where the diamonds are characterised as lootable, it has led to the 
gruesome civil war (Maconachie, 2008). In Zimbabwe, the alluvial diamonds have acted as 
non-lootable diamonds, which consequently, has led to the legitimate government taking 
control of these diamonds (PAC, 2009). The different outcomes, where it lead to civil war in 
Sierra Leone and government control in Zimbabwe, has had a substantial impact of the KPCS 
effectiveness in the two cases, which will be further analysed in the next section.  
 
5.5.2 Main Beneficiaries of Conflicts Diamonds 
The main beneficiaries of conflict diamonds have differentiated in Sierra Leone and 
Zimbabwe. In Sierra Leone, the main beneficiaries of conflict diamonds consisted of the rebel 
group, RUF. They used alluvial diamonds to finance illegal activities, which led to the 
commencement of civil war. Lulaja (2010) states how natural resources play a fundamental 
part in violent conflict, especially in regards to those resources that are easily extractable. The 
lootable alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone, exemplifies this and how they were able to 
facilitate and finance the countries gruesome civil war. 
 
Collier (2002) argues how, conflict can easily escalate when a country relies on primary 
commodity export. In accordance with this, diamond where being unlawfully traded out of 
Sierra Leone to neighbouring countries such as Liberia, in order to finance RUF’s activities. 
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Sierra Leone’s civil war shows how diamonds had a leading role in the violence. Diamonds 
did not only allow Sierra Leones civil war to happen, but it drove it (Maconachie, 2008). The 
lootable diamonds, with their geographically diffuseness and low economic barriers were 
subjected to predation by the RUF and consequently, this led to the commencement of the 
civil war. 
 
Collier & Hoeffler (2002) puts forth two main arguments for why armed conflicts occur. 
These conflicts can either be driven by greed or grievance, by rebel groups. The greed 
argument is most suitable in the case of Sierra Leone, as the economic aspect of wanting more 
power, and money from the diamonds drove RUF. This argument, fits well into Sierra Leone, 
as it is rebel centric. However, one can argue how this argument does not hold in Zimbabwe’s 
case. This is because it has failed to take into account governments of resource abundant 
countries. Governments also have the ability to take control of resources, and the revenues 
that come from these resources (HRW 2004).   
 
In a similar manner, Le Billion (2001) explains this by arguing how developing countries that 
are poor and have weak institutions, make it possible for politicians to distribute the resource 
rents for political gains and support their authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the above 
stated, goes had in hand with corruption and a weak rule of law, which is illustrated in 
Zimbabwe; where Mugabe’s regime, has gained incomprehensible power. It can be argued 
how the main beneficiaries of conflict diamonds in Zimbabwe has been the government, that 
is to say, Mugabe’s and the ZANU PF regime (PAC, 2009). They have been able to use the 
diamonds found in the Marange in order to facilitate authoritarianism. Which in turn, has 
created a conflict of its own sort, where corruption, smuggling and human rights abuse is 
occurring.  
 
An interesting aspect, considering these actors, is that the KPCS was established in order to 
deal with rebel groups that have captured and taken control of diamonds.  However, it can be 
argued how this shows how the KPCS has neglected to take into account that governments 
can also take control of diamonds, in order to acquire power. One reason for this could be that 
it is harder to deal with a ‘corrupted’ government, which is officially considered as 
‘legitimate’, such as Zimbabwe’s government. It can be implied how another reason could be 
that the KPCS has not taken into account other actors, as they have merely focused on rebel 
groups. In contrast to the first reason, which can be considered as more of a practical problem, 
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the latter reason is based on KPCS limited definition of conflict diamonds. This is because the 
definition only involves one type of actor. 
 
5.5.3 Conflict Diamond Definition  
It can be argued that one of the main reasons to why the KPCS has failed to react effectively 
towards the Marange diamonds in Zimbabwe is because of the KP’s vague definition of 
conflict diamonds (GW, 2010). The definition states how conflict diamonds are ‘rough 
diamonds used by rebel groups to finance wars against the legitimate government’ (KP 2015). 
However this definition has problematizing consequences for several reasons when applying 
it to Zimbabwe. One can imply, that this is due to the fact that in Zimbabwe, it is the 
legitimate government that has been using the diamonds to finance violence, not the rebel 
groups. 
 
In accordance with this, Jojartha (2009) argues how the definition is partial towards the 
legitimate government, as the KP has not state what the concept legitimate government 
means. Consequently, each government gets too much authority. One can argue how the 
Zimbabwean government has exploited the scheme, due to the vague definition in order to 
acquire their own legitimate power and protect their interests (GW 2010).  
 
As mentioned, a conflict diamond is narrowly defined as one sold by a rebel group to start 
war against a legitimate government. It can be argued how this definition has left a major 
loophole within the KPCS. One can imply that this is because; the definition does not prevent 
a government like Zimbabwe from committing abuses when it mines or sells diamonds 
(Guardian, 2013). Subsequently, this has had severe consequences for the KPCS credibility, 
due to the fact that Zimbabwe’s government has proved how governments that control 
diamonds “can come with as much spilled blood as the rebel controlled variety” (Nichols, 
2012; 676).  
 
The situation of Zimbabwe has raised awareness of the fact that the definition is to narrow. It 
can be argued, that this is because the definition has failed to address different circumstances 
associated with conflict diamonds. Subsequently, one can imply how the definition was 
tailored to fit the situation of the civil war in Sierra Leone. A situation; where rebels captured 
and used diamonds to finance their illegal activities to wage war against the government. This 
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has limited the KPCS possibility to be effective in other circumstances, than the once was one 
found in Sierra Leone. Zimbabwe, exemplifies this.  
 
Considering the current KPCS model, and definition of conflict diamonds, it could be argued 
how the KPCS has a better chance at mitigating conflict diamonds in countries that share 
similar circumstances/pre-conditions that are found in Sierra Leone, than countries that differ 
from the circumstances found in Sierra Leone.   
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6 Conclusion 
This final chapter summarises my findings and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
 
6.1 Concluding Remarks  
The findings of the paper have shown how the KPCS have been more successful in Sierra 
Leone than in Zimbabwe. This has been done by examining and analysing the two countries 
different circumstances. Subsequently, this paper can draw numerous conclusions. The 
geological characteristics of diamonds have had an impact on the KPCS capacity to be 
successful. This is because, the geological characteristics have a significant impact on who 
captures, controls and benefits from the diamonds. Consequently, the beneficiaries of the 
diamonds have a crucial role in how successful and effective the KPCS can be in mitigating 
conflict diamonds. This is because the KPCS has limited themselves to only deal with rebel 
groups. Therefore, the corrupted government in Zimbabwe becomes an example of the KPCS 
ignorance to take other actors into account.  
 
A major finding in this paper, which can also be considered as the greatest cause to the KPCS 
ineffectiveness, lies in the KP’s definition of conflict diamonds. As the scheme, was created 
and tailored to fit situations like the one that was once found in Sierra Leone, it can be argued 
how it has only taken into account of specific circumstances of a country. Due to this, the 
definition has shown to be too vague and narrow, since the definition only includes one 
certain actor, which are the rebel groups. Since the KPCS has only focused on the connection 
between diamonds and civil war, it excludes other circumstances, like the situation in 
Zimbabwe showed. This is a problem, not only for Zimbabwe, but also for other countries 
that are faced with similar issues. However, since the KPCS is an extremely important tool 
towards mitigating conflict diamonds, and is thus far, the only tool that aims at doing so, it 
can still be seen as a crucial. However, it can be argued how the scheme needs to be 
reconsidered in various aspects.  
 
One possible solution could be to broaden the official definition of conflict diamonds. By 
broadening the definition, the KPCS could be able to adapt to other situations, taking factors, 
like the ones I have mentioned into account. Nevertheless, if it is not possible to broaden the 
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definition, another solution might have to be considered in order to be able to mitigate conflict 
diamonds altogether. 
 
6.2 Future Research  
Future research should aim at examining and analysing other countries that are faced with the 
issue of conflict diamonds. Since this paper has come to several conclusions, it would be 
interesting to see if these conclusions are applicable in other conflict diamond affected 
countries. Hence, if the KPCS experiences the same problems towards mitigating conflict 
diamonds in countries where the circumstances differ from the KPCS definition, the papers 
findings could in fact be generalised in a greater extent. As this study includes only two 
countries, it cannot generalise the KPCS effectiveness as a whole.    
 
Another future research that would be interesting to conduct would be to examine other 
possible solutions that aim towards mitigating conflict diamonds. Since the KPCS has 
obvious flaws, another tool could perhaps be seen as more effective and successful. This tool 
could perhaps be used in countries that the KPCS has failed to be effective enough in.  
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